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Notes and Comments
THE LEGALITY OF THE "REVISED
PHILADELPHIA PLAN"
Now the term 'quota system' has been added to the racialjargon and it has become one of the most contentious
terms in the civil rights dialectic. It has divided the
ranks on the civil rights front and those who use it
have even been charged with favoring discrimination.'
The Revised Philadelphia Plan,2 first promulgated in a Labor
Department memorandum dated June 27, 1969, and supplemented by
an order dated September 23, 1969, has as its avowed purpose:
[t]o implement the provisions of Executive Order 11246, and
the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto, requiring a
program of equal employment opportunity by Federal contractors
and subcontractors and Federally-assisted construction contractors
and subcontractorsY
Very generally, it requires that certain government contractors make
at least a good-faith effort to meet definite minimum numerical
standards of minority group utilization in specified trades in the
Philadelphia area. While it may be technically incorrect to refer to
the Revised Plan as a "quota system," it resembles one closely enough
to have caused a division of opinion. The battle lines have been
drawn with the unions' and Elmer Staats, Comptroller General of
the United States, 5 opposing the Revised Plan's legality, and the
Department of Labor8 and the Department of Justice7 supporting it.
Certainly the eventual judicial resolution of the argument will influence
1. Abrams, Foreword to R. CATxFR, D. KYNYoN, P. MAacusg, & L. ML R,
EQUALITY at viii (1965).
2. The current proposal is "revised" because the Comptroller rejected the original
promulgation on the grounds that the plan did not include a description of the specifics
of the "affirmative action" program in the solicitations for bids, so as to be incom-
patible with competitive bidding requirements. 23 U.S.C. 112 (1964). See 42 COMP.
GEN. 1 (1962). See also 115 CONG. REc. 13,077 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 1969).
3. Order from Arthur A. Fletcher § 1, June 27, 1969, United States Dep't ofLabor, 115 CONG. REc. 17,133 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1969). [hereinafter cited as June
27 order].
4. Washington Post, Dec. 21, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
5. Comp. GxN. B163026 (1969). [hereinafter cited COMPTROLLUR'S OPINION].
6. Memorandum, Authority Under Executive Order 11246, United States Dep't
of Labor, Office of the Solicitor [hereinafter cited Solicitor's Memorandum].
7. __ Op. AT'y G9N. __ (1969).
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the course that the civil rights movement will follow in the next
few years."
This comment will examine the legality of the Revised Philadelphia
Plan in light of its alleged conflict with section 703(j), Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' and with its alleged provision for an
illegal quota system.
I. HISTORY OF THE PLAN
On June 25, 1941, President Roosevelt, prompted by a threatened
march on Washington to protest the federal government's discrim-
inatory hiring practices,' 0 made the first executive pronouncement
regarding racial discrimination in employment. Executive Order
8,8021 proclaimed:
I do hereby reaffirm the policy of the United States that
there shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers
in defense industries or government because of race, creed, color,
or national origin, and I do hereby declare that it is the duty
of employers and of labor organizations, in furtherance of said
policy and of this order, to provide for the full and equitable
participation of all workers in defense industries, without dis-
crimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin. 2
He established the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC)
which was empowered to investigate complaints and take appropriate
steps to redress any grievances.'" However, the Committee's success
was limited because it did not possess any direct enforcement powers,
but rather had to rely on the President to impose its recommended
sanctions. As a result, the Committee concentrated on making state-
ments of policy, and any positive results the FEPC effected were
achieved through the use of public hearings and the unfavorable public
opinion they necessarily evoked.' 4
8. See Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 9, 1970, at 1, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Feb. 10,1970, at 30, col. 4. As announced by Secretary of Labor George Shultz, the Phila-delphia Plan will be extended to at least eighteen other cities unless the localitiesdevise adequate plans to remedy discriminatory practices. In response to this an-
nouncement, Arthur Fletcher, Assistant Secretary for Wage and Labor Standards,predicted that this announcement would spur contractors and unions to develop ac-
ceptable plans: "None of them wants a Philadelphia Plan or public hearings. The
option of developing their own plans gives them an escape hatch."
Id. at col. 5.
9. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1964) [herein-
after cited as Civil Rights Act of 1964].
10. M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTs ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 9 (1966).
11. Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. M. SOVeRN, LZOAL RtsTRAirNTs ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 10-12 (1966).
Since the FEPC lacked significant Weapons of sanction, it usually resorted to theissuance of "directives" toward the employer. The directives, to a limited extent,
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Executive Order 9,346"s abolished the first Committee, created
a second Fair Employment Practices Committee and expanded its
predecessor's concept by making the order applicable to all federal
government contracts and to union membership. It also defined the
scope of "discrimination" that was prohibited:
[t]o eliminate discrimination in regard to hire, tenure, terms
or conditions of employment, or union membership because of
race, creed, color, or national origin. 16
However, like its predecessor, the new committee's efficiency was re-
stricted by the absence of any significant weapons of sanction. Its
directives were without force of law, and it was forced to rely on
the President for enforcement. The committee did conduct public
hearings, however, and the unfavorable publicity issuing from such
against an alleged violator was often sufficient to compel compliance
with the committee's directives."
The second FEPC functioned until 1945 when it was deprived
of operating funds by the Russell Amendment,"8 and, until December
3, 1951, no office of the government served the function of urging
individual agency and employer compliance. On that date, President
Truman created the Committee on Government Contract Compliance19
to investigate what steps the government agencies were taking to
effectuate the avowed policy of non-discrimination - at the same time,
intending to leave enforcement in the hands of the individual agency
heads. However, President Truman left office one year later, and his
prophesy today's standards save for the expanded affirmative action concept of more
recent orders. Typically they required employers to:
1. "Cease and desist" from [discrimination] practices;2. Adjust its employment policies and practices so that all needed workers
will be hired or upgraded without regard to race, creed, color, or national
origin;
3. Extend in-plant training to all qualified employees without regard to race,
creed, color, or national origin;
4. Issue formal instructions to all personnel officers and employees having
authority to hire and upgrade workers, and prospective workers, solely on
the basis of the qualifications of workers or applicants for employment
without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin;
5. Give formal notice to all employment agencies, public or private, through
which it recruits workers or trainees, that it will accept workers for all
classifications of work or training, solely on the basis of their qualifications
without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin;
6. Submit monthly statistical reports revealing the classification of newly
hired employees;
7. Abrogate wherever necessary provisions of existing contracts which are
repugnant to the national policy expressed in the Executive Order;
8. Submit periodic compliance reports; and
9. Eliminate all questions as to race and religion from employment appli-
cation forms.
Id. at 11-12.
15. 8 Fed. Reg. 7183 (1943).
16. Id.
17. M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 14 (1966).
18. 31 U.S.C. § 696 (1964). The Russell Amendment denies federal funds to
any agencies established by executive orders in existence for more than one year if
Congress had not specifically appropriated funds for that particular agency.
19. Exec. Order No. 10,308, 16 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1951).
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committee was superseded by the creation of Executive Order 10,479.20President Eisenhower's effort in reality did nothing more than re-
activate the Truman Committee, and the new committee accepted
some of the investigation's recommendations.2 x The new Government
Contract Committee was authorized to receive complaints directly
but, upon receiving them, it was empowered only to direct them to the
appropriate agency. Still hampered by the lack of independent sanc-
tion powers that had plagued its predecessors, its performance was
disappointing.2 2
On March 6, 1961, President Kennedy gave the first real impetus
to the fight against discrimination in employment. Until the Kennedy
Administration, the duty imposed on employers had been one only
of passive non-discrimination. However, Executive Order 10,92523
provided: "The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that
applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during em-ployment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national
origin. '"24 No longer was the employer's duty phrased negatively. He
was now obligated to take positive steps to prevent discrimination.
The Order established the Committee on Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity and, for the first time, the enforcement agency was provided
with sufficient sanctions to compel compliance. The committee was
authorized to hold public hearings and publish violators' names, to
seek the Department of Justice's aid to obtain injunctions, to terminate
or suspend existing contracts and, most importantly, to deny a bidder's
entry into a new contract until he had complied with the provisions of
the order.25 Since the ultimate authority for enforcement was finally
taken from the individual agency heads and placed in its logical place,
the committee responded with a significantly improved program in
remedying discriminatory practices.26 But, fearing condemnation by
the courts as an usurpation of legislative authority, it was wary in
the exercise of its sanction powers.2 ' The enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 quieted these fears.
Congress had enunciated a policy of equal employment opportunityin various pieces of New Deal legislation, 2 but, in effect, these served
only as statements of policy. Between 1946 and 1963 there were
numerous attempts to introduce legislation to make such a policy
binding in the form of a Fair Employment Practices Act, but very
20. Exec. Order No. 10,479, 18 Fed. Reg. 4899 (1953).21. REPORT OP THE PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON GOVERNMENT CONTRACT COMPLIANCE,
EQUAL ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY (1953).
22. REPORT OP THE PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, FIVE YEARS
or PROGRSS (1958); SIXTH REPORT Or THE PRESMNT'S COMM. ON GOVERNMENTCONTRACTS (1959); SEVENTH REPORT OV THE PRSI:DNT'S COMM. ON GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS (1960).
23. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 1978.26. REPORT ON THE Pa"SmENT'S COMM'N ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
4 (1963).27. M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 113 (1966).28. Unemployment Relief Act of 1933, ch. 17, 48 Stat. 22 (1933) ; National In-dustrial Recovery Act of 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
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few bills were even reported out of committee. Then, on June 20,
1963, Congressman Emmanuel Celler (D., N.Y.) introduced H.R.
71522" which eventually was to be enacted into law as the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.30 On June 17, 1964, the Senate adopted what was gen-
erally a compromise measure; on July 2, 1964, the House adopted the
Senate version, and, on the same day, President Johnson signed the
bill into law.
Title VII,3' one of eleven titles in the Act, specifically prohibits
all discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin by an employer, employment agency or labor organiza-
tion. However, these three categories are not all-inclusive because
only "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce" or the
"agent of such a person" is an employer, 2 and only a labor organiza-
tion "engaged in an industry affecting commerce, and any agent of
such an organization" is a labor organization. 8 Generally, the Act
defines the scope of unlawful employment practices, 4 creates the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.85 and presents remedial action
available -for a violation of the Act. 6
29. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
30. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1964).
It is interesting to note the tremendous amount of debate and amendment that
preceded passage of the Act. There were ten days of debate and eighteen amend-
ments in the House and eighty-three days of debate and eighty-seven amendments in
the Senate, consuming 534 hours, one minute and thirty-seven seconds. UNITED
STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMm'N LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITIS
VII AND XI Ol CIVIL RIGHTS AcT or 1964 10-11.
31. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
32. Id. at § 701 (b).
33. Id. at § 701 (d).
These limitations have been subject to criticism because it was prophesied that
when Title VII became fully effective, it would affect only eight percent of employers
and only forty percent of employees. M. SOvERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL Dis-
CRIMINATION 65 (1966).
34. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a),(c)
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer: (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization: (1) to
exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;(2) to limit, segregate, classifiy its membership, or to classify or fail or
refuse to refer for employment, any individual, in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit
such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an in-
dividual in violation of the section.
35. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 705.
36. Id. at §§ 706-07. These sections generally provide that the EEOC will en-
force its decisions through the use of civil suits and that the Attorney General may
institute civil suits on his own behalf for noncompliance with Title VII's demands.
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Executive Order 11,246,7 signed by President Johnson on Sep-
tember 24, 1965, is a continuation of the executive branch's involvement
in the area of discrimination in employment, and within its limited
sphere of government employment generally and of government con-
struction contracts specifically, would seem to be a much more power-
ful weapon than Title VII. Similarly to Executive Order 10,925,
the Order provides: "The Contractor will take affirmative action to
ensure that applicants are treated during employment, without regard
to their race, creed, color, or national origin. Such action shall include
but not be limited to the following: employment ... recruitment .. ."38
The Order provides for various sanctions - most of which,
except for those arising under Title VII, were copied directly from
Executive Order 10,925.89 Like its predecessor, Executive Order
11,246 did not define "affirmative action," but it did provide for the
authority to make that determination: "The Secretary of Labor shall
be responsible for the administration of Parts II and III of this Order
and shall adopt such rules and regulations as he deems necessary and
appropriate to achieve the purposes thereof."4
Pursuant to this authorization, the Secretary of Labor established
the Office of Federal Contract Compliance as the agency directly
responsible for the implementation of the provisions of Executive Order
11,246.41 The Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) regu-
lations42 demand that each government agency, when soliciting bids,
require its prospective contractors to submit written affirmative action
programs.
The contractor's program shall provide in detail for specific
steps to guarantee equal employment opportunity keyed to the
problems and needs of members of minority groups, including,
when there are deficiencies, the development of specific goals and
time tables for the prompt achievement of full and equal employ-
ment opportunity.43
II. THE REVISED PHILADELPHIA PLAN
Once the Department of Labor, through the OFCC, had provided
for the use of "specific goals and timetables," a short and logical ex-
37. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (Supp. IV,
1964). [hereinafter cited as Exec. Order No. 11,246]. For a detailed analysis of this
order see Note, Executive Order 11246: Anti-Discrimination Obligations in Govern-
ment Contracts, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rrv. 591 (1969).
38. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 202(1).
39. Id. at § 209. The Secretary of Labor or the appropriate agency may: (a)
publish the names of noncomplying unions and contractors; (b) recommend to the
Department of Justice the use of injunctions to compel compliance; (c) recommend
to the Department of Justice or the EEOC that appropriate proceedings be instituted
under Title VII; (d) recommend to the Department of Justice the bringing of crimi-
nal actions against those supplying false information; (e) cancel, suspend, or termi-
nate existing contracts; and (f) prohibit government agencies from entering into
contracts with contractors deemed not in compliance with the terms of this order.
40. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 201.
41. Secretary's Order No. 26-65, United States Dep't of Labor, 31 Fed. Reg.
6921 (1966).
42. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40 (1969).
43. Id. at § 60-1.40(a).
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tension of this rationale resulted in the promulgation of the Revised
Philadelphia Plan. The first announcement of the Plan by the Depart-
ment of Labor, a memorandum dated June 27, 1969," explained the
purpose, standards and functioning of the Revised Plan, and the second,
an order dated September 23, 1969,' 5 set forth the specifics of the plan's
demands applicable to the Philadelphia area. The conclusions which
precipitated the Revised Plan's formulation were the result of a study
conducted by the OFCC in Philadelphia and its surrounding counties,4"
regarding the practices in seven construction trades. The analysis
revealed that, in the construction industry, employers must hire a new
complement of employees for each project. Traditionally, this has
been effected through the medium of union referrals. It was discovered
that the unions in these particular trades claim a minutely small
percentage of minority group personnel as members; the result naturally
followed that a very small number of minority group members -
in relation to the available work force - were ever referred for
employment.48
The order provides that the only means of remedying such inequity
is by "requiring bidders to commit themselves to specific goals of
minority manpower utilization. '4  The order describes the contractor's
requirement:
A bidder's affirmative action program will be acceptable if the
specific goals set by the bidder meet the definite standards deter-
mined in accordance with Section 6 below.5"
Such definite standards shall specify the range of minority man-
power utilization expected for each of the designated trades to be
used during the performance of the construction contract. To be
eligible for the award of the contract, the bidder must, in the
affirmative action program submitted with his bid, set specific goals
of minority manpower utilization which meet the definite standard
included in the invitation or other solicitation for bids .... 51
The definite standards that are to be included in the bid are to
be computed from a consideration of four factors:
44. June 27 Order.
45. Order from Arthur A. Fletcher and John L. Wilks, September 23, 1969,
United States Dept. of Labor, 115 CoNG. Rc. 17,135 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1969)[hereinafter cited as September 23, Order].
46. The counties involved in the study were Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Mont-
gomery, and Philadelphia. June 27 Order § 2.
47. The seven construction trades investigated were: iron workers, plumbers
and pipefitters, steamfitters, sheet metal workers, electrical workers, roofers and
waterproofers, and elevator construction workers. Id. at § 3.
48. June 27 Order § 4, states:
The unions in these trades still have only about 1.6 percent minority group
membership and they continue to engage in practices, including the granting of
referral priorities to union members and to persons who have work experience
under union contracts, which result in few Negroes being referred for employment.
49. Id. at § 4.
50. Id. at § 5.
51. Id. at § 6(a).
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(1) The current extent of minority group participation in the
trade.
(2) The availability of minority group persons for employment
in such trade.
(3) The need for training programs in the area and/or the need
to assure demand for those in or from existing training
programs.
(4) The impact of the program upon the existing labor force.52
If the contractor provides a goal within the acceptable standard and
is awarded the contract, he must make a "good-faith" effort to fulfill
his forecast:
In the event of failure to meet the goals, the contractor shall
be given an opportunity to demonstrate that he made every good
faith effort to meet his commitment. In any proceeding in which
such good faith is in issue, the contractor's entire compliance
posture shall be reviewed and evaluated in the process of con-
sidering the imposition of sanctions.5 3
The Plan recognizes that many of these contractors might have col-
lective bargaining agreements with unions which are carrying on
discriminatory practices. However, it also points out that such practices
are in violation of the National Labor Relations Act and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and, if a contractor relies on such
unions, he cannot be exonerated for failing to meet his contractual
requirements.54
The demands upon the contractor are carefully restricted to avoid
the obvious criticism of "reverse discrimination": "The purpose of the
contractor's commitment to specific goals is to meet the contractor's
affirmative action obligations and is not intended and shall not be used
to discriminate against any qualified applicant or employee. ' 55
The Department of Labor conducted hearings in Philadelphia on
August 26, 27 and 29, 1969, in order to translate the four standards
into numerical terms."" Concerning the factor of current minority
52. Id. at § 6(c).
53. Id. at § 8 (a). For an explanation of how the plan is to be administered
within the framework of "good-faith effort," see 115 CONG. Ric. 17,135 (daily ed.
Dec. 18, 1969).
54. June 27 Order § 8(b).
55. Id. at § 6(b) (2).
56. On February 3, 1970, the Department of Labor issued Order No. 4, extend-
ing the scope and applicability of the affirmative action concept to the area of non-
construction contracts. Basically, this affirmative action program requires: (1) an
analysis of the job categories with explanation if minority groups are currently
"underutilized" ("underutilization" is defined as having fewer minorities in a par-
ticular job category than would reasonably be expected by their availability) ; and(2) specific goals and timetables if deficiencies exist; if such are not provided, the
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
group participation in the trade, the investigation, the findings of
which are included in the order of September 23, 1969, revealed that
the construction industry in the Philadelphia area has a minority group
representation of thirty percent. However, the representation in the
skilled labor trades dwindles to twelve percent, and, in the six trades
in particular, 57 the representation evaporates to approximately one
percent. Regarding the criteria of the availability of minorities for
employment in these areas and the need for vocational training, it was
also disclosed that the non-white unemployment rate was twice that
of the white rate, that between 1,200 and 1,400 trained and/or ex-
perienced minority craftsmen are available for employment in these
trades and that between 5,000 and 8,000 prospective minority craftsmen
would begin training if there were assurance of the availability of
employment.5 8 Consideration of the last factor - the impact of the
program upon the existing labor force - determined that in each trade
there would be an annual vacancy rate of approximately ten percent.5 9
An interpretation of these factors resulted in the prescribing of
a range of acceptable standards for the employment of minority group
members by contractors of federally involved construction projects.
Since the average federal project lasts between two and four years,
standards were provided for the next four years. 0 Generally, the lower
levels on the first year of the Plan are approximately four percent
while the upper levels at the fourth year are approximately 24 percent.
The increase is gradual and, in view of the ten percent attrition rate
contractor must in written detail explain his lack of a goal in light of certain factors
provided in the order. 38 U.S.L.W. 2447 (Feb. 3, 1970).
This differs from the Philadelphia Plan in that the goals or timetables are not
set by the contracting agency, and, in fact, it would seem that submission to numerical
standards is not an absolute prerequisite to the awarding of a contract.
57. The Department of Labor has since concluded that there is adequate minority
group representation in the trade denoted "roofers and waterproofers." September
23 Order § 2.
58. Although these statistics demonstrate the present effect of past discriminatory
practices in the construction trades, because the Department of Labor has failed to
include a statistical analysis of the availability of white craftsmen or prospective
craftsmen for comparison, there is no indication of what effect the plan would have
upon the future racial balance in these trades.
59. September 23 Order § 3. This ten percent figure was reached by adding the
proposed growth rate (2.5%) to the calculated attrition rate (7.5%). This figure
takes on significance when the minimum standards are set in each trade. Generally,
for the first year, the lower levels of the plan demand either four or five percent
minority group participation in each trade. Since the attrition rate is ten percent, "the
lower range figure may be met by filling vacancies and new jobs approximately on the
basis of one minority craftsman for each non-minority craftsman." Id. at § 3 (f).
60. Id. at § 4. The following ranges were established as standards for minority
manpower utilization for each trade for four years:
Range of Minority Group Employment
(Percent)
Until Until Until Until
Trade Dec. 31, 1970 Dec. 31, 1971 Dec. 31, 1972 Dec. 31, 1973
Ironworkers 5-9 11-15 16-20 22-26
Plumbers & Pipefitters 5-8 10-14 15-19 20-24
Steamfitters 5-8 11-15 15-19 20-24
Sheetmetal Workers 4-8 9-13 14-18 19-23
Electrical Workers 4-8 9-13 14-18 19-23
Elevator Construction
Workers 4-8 9-13 14-18 19-23
Id.
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in each trade, seems to be based on a system which will alternate
hiring blacks and whites for the entire extent of the Plan."
III. THE LEGALITY OF THE PLAN
A. Conflict with Section 703(j)
The first criticism that has been leveled at the Revised Plan's
legality is its alleged conflict with section 703(j) of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.6" This section provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to
require any employer, employment agency, labor organization, orjoint labor-management committee subject to this sub-chapter to
grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of
such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may
exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons
of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by
any employer, referred or classified for employment by any employ-
ment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or
classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in,
any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with
the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section,
or other area, or in the available work force in any community,
State, section, or other area.68
This provision, an addition of the Dirksen-Mansfield compromise based
on Senator Allott's (R., Colo.) amendment,64 was formulated to silence
objections that Title VII would compel employers to maintain some
form of racial balance in their work force.
In comparing the language of section 703(j) with the provisions
of the Revised Plan it must be remembered that the Plan's numerical
standards are determined by a consideration of four factors: the
current extent of minority group participation in the trade; the avail-
ability of minority group persons for employment in such trades; the
need for vocational training programs; and the effect of such a plan
61. See note 56 supra.
62. COMPtROUXR'S OPINION 7-8.
63. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (j) (1964) (emphasis added).
64. Amendment No. 568, 110 CONG. 1 c. 9881-82 (1964). The amendment pro-
vided:
The court shall not find, in any civil action brought under this title, that the
respondent has engaged in or is engaging in an unlawful employment practice
charged in the complaint solely on the basis of evidence that an imbalance exists
with respect to the total number of percentage of persons of any race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer, referred or classifiedfor employment by any employment agency, admitted to membership, or classifiedby any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or
other training program, in comparison with the total number or percentage ofpersons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community,State, section, or other area, without supporting evidence of another nature that
the respondent has engaged in or is engaging in such practice.
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on the existing labor force. Although the Plan affords no indication
of the relative importance of these four criteria it may be reasonably
inferred that, by virtue of the first two, significant weight must be
given to a comparison of current minority group participation and the
size of the relevant available minority group work force. Section 703 (j)
in essence requires that no employer be obligated to grant preferential
treatment to a group, because of that group's race, on account of an
imbalance which may already exist in his employ in comparison with
the number of such group in the area or in the available work force.
It would appear then that a literal construction of section 703(j)
would definitely preclude consideration of the first two criteria.
The Solicitor of Labor in a memorandum supporting the legality
of the Plan assumes, without admitting, that the Plan does require
the proscribed "preferential treatment." His refusal to make such
an admission is compelled by the fact that the plan, on its face, pur-
ports to prohibit discriminatory practices against any qualified appli-
cant.65 However as discussed below, a degree of preferential treatment
may be implicit in the effective operation of the plan.6 He argues
that section 703(j) prohibits only preferential treatment which is
"'on account" of racial imbalance and that because the Plan's minority
group participation requirements are "on account" of discrimination,
not racial imbalance they do not fall within the act's proscription. 7
This argument, of course, rests upon the premise that the terms
racial imbalance and discrimination denote distinct and mutually ex-
clusive concepts. If this premise is not accepted, the solicitor's con-
tentions must fail. It may be tenably argued that the term racial
imbalance as used in section 703 (j) is a general term denoting simply
an unacceptably low ratio of minority group employment to minority
group availability. Such ratio may result from a variety of causal
factors one of which may have been a sustained pattern of racial dis-
crimination. Thus it would seem that the drafters of section 703(j)
intended merely that no employer be required to hire minority group
employees solely because of an existing racial imbalance, regardless
of the cause of that imbalance.
Some support for this interpretation may be found in the legis-
lative history of Title VII. Illustrative is an interpretive memorandum
submitted by Senators Clark (D., Pa.) and Case (R., N.J.), the floor
managers of the bill:
There is no requirement in Title VII that an employer
maintain a racial balance in his work force. On the contrary,
any deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance, whatever such
a balance may be, would involve a violation of Title VII because
maintaining such a balance would require an employer to hire or
to refuse to hire on the basis of race. It must be emphasized that
discrimination is prohibited as to any individual. While the
presence or absence of other members of the same minority in
65. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
66. See Section IV infra.
67. Solicitor's Memorandum 36.
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the work force may be a relevant factor in determining whether
in a given case the decision to hire or to refuse to hire was based
on race, color, etc., it is only one factor, and the question in each
case would be whether that individual was discriminated against. 68
In order to avoid this conflict with section 703(j) the Solicitor
has offered two additional arguments: first, that because Executive
Order 11,246, pursuant to which the Revised Plan was issued, does
not contain a section parallel to section 703(j), such restriction on
affirmative action is not applicable to the plan;69 and second, that
Congress has sanctioned the concept of affirmative action in both Ex-
ecutive Order 11,246 and in the formation of the OFCC.7 ° As to the
first argument it must be noted that even if the inapplicability of section
703(j) to Executive Order 11,246 and its progeny is accepted, the
Solicitor would still have to overcome certain language in the order
itself: "The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that
applicants are employed .... wuithout regard to their race, creed, color,
or national origin."" While this provision may not accurately be
called a precise parallel to section 703(j) it does seem to convey an
idea so similiar to the historical interpretation of that section that it
would appear to raise the same restriction on affirmative action."2
The Solicitor's second argument, that Congress has sanctioned the
affirmative action concept in both Executive Order 11,246 and in the
formation of the OFCC is more meritorious. The concept of affirmative
action had been promulgated when Title VII was first introduced.78
Thus the bill's explicit recognition of Executive Order 10,925 (which
first enunciated the affirmative action concept) as a concurrent means
of regulation in the area of discrimination in employment in its text 74
and in its legislative history75 operated, in effect, as a sanction of the
affirmative action concept. The Solicitor carries this reasoning one
step further to conclude that this sanction should now extend to
68. 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964). Senator Humphrey's (D., Minn.) views are in
accord:
A new subsection 703(j) is added to deal with the problem of racial balance
among employees. The proponents of this bill have carefully stated on numerous
occasions that Title VII does not require an employer to achieve any sort of
racial balance in his work force by giving preferential treatment to any individual
or group. Since doubts have persisted, subsection 703(j) is added to state this
point expressly. This subsection does not represent any change in the substance
of the title. It does state clearly and accurately what we have maintained all
along about the bill's intent and meaning. Id. at 12,722.
See also 110 CONG. Rzc. 8921 (1964) (remarks of Senator Williams).
69. Solicitor's Memorandum 36.
70. Id. at 8-23.
71. Exec. Order No. 11,246 § 202(1) (emphasis added).
72. As he interprets § 703(j), the Solicitor notes:
"This section forbids finding an employer or union in violation of Title VI1
solely because the racial composition of its work force or membership does not
mirror the ratio that a given minority group bears to the general population in a
given geographical area."
Solicitor's Memorandum 37. This, however, would seem to be an interpretation of
the original amendment on which § 703(j) was based. See note 62 supra.
73. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
74. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 709(d).
75. 110 CONG. RUc. 2706-08, 7212-15, 13650-52 (1964).
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Executive Order 11,246 and to the OFCC, which was formed pursuant
to the Executive Order and to which Congress has appropriated funds."8
This conclusion appears sound; however, on one occasion congressional
debate did appear to evidence dissatisfaction with the Labor Depart-
ment's interpretation of congressional intent.
Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress had
not had occasion to express its intent beyond the verbiage of Title VII
nor on the developments per Executive Order 11,246 and the OFCC
regulations. However, an amendment to the Supplemental Appropria-
tions Bill of 197077 provided an opportunity to at least register
congressional approval of the Revised Plan. Amendment No. 33,
incorporated as section 904 of the bill, provided:
In view of and in confirmation of the authority invested in the
Comptroller General of the United States by the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921, as amended, no part of the funds ap-
propriated or made available by this or any other Act shall be
available to finance, either directly or through any Federal aid or
grant, any contract or agreement which the Comptroller General
of the United States holds to be in contravention of any Federal
statute.
7 8
While the Revised Plan was not specifically mentioned, since the
Comptroller had ruled that the Plan was in contravention of section
703(j),7' the effect of this amendment would have been to deny funds
to any contractor who had participated in the program. However,
while the amendment would have effectively blocked the Plan, it was
worded much more broadly than necessary for that purpose, and much
debate was directed at the overbreath of the language.80 In spite of
the all inclusive language, on December 18, 1969, the Senate denied
approval of the Plan by adopting the amendment by a seventy-three
to thirteen vote."' On the following day, the House disagreed to
numerous Senate amendments, including Amendment No. 33, and
agreed to the conference asked by the Senate. 2 On December 20, 1969,
the committee of conference reported disagreement over the conflict
regarding Amendment No. 33,8' and three days later the House voted
76. Funds were provided for the Office of Wage and Labor Standards of which
the OFCC was a branch when President Nixon signed into law the Labor-HEW
Appropriations Bill. H.R. 15,931, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
77. H.R. 15,209, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
78. 115 CONG. RSc. 17,153 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1969).
79. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
80. E.g., 115 CONG. RUc. 17,139 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1969). Senator Javits (R.,
N.Y.) remarked:
So he [the Comptroller] holds it to be in contravention of any Federal
Statute, and he, in fact, controls the purse strings of the United States. Then he,
the top man in this country - and perhaps the 7 days in May have arrived - of
all people is the real ruler of the country, the Comptroller General of the United
States.
81. 115 CONG. Rc. 17,157 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1969).
82. 115 CONG. REc. 12,822 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1969).
83. 115 CONG. Rsc. 12,855 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1969).
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208 to 156 to uphold its previous action disapproving the Senate
amendment."4
On the same day as the House action, the Senate was faced once
again with Amendment No. 33. However, the legislators were under
pressure from lobbyists, 5 the President (who had threatened a veto
if the amendment was not deleted)," and from the prospect of an
abbreviated Christmas holiday." The Senate voted thirty-nine to
twenty-nine to delete the amendment."'
Primarily, the amendment was much broader than necessary to
withdraw support from the Philadelphia Plan, and certainly such an
amendment could have presented grave constitutional issues regarding
the authority of the Comptroller General. But it would seem that in
light of the margins of the votes taken and the attendant circumstances
the Senate has registered at least discontent with the OFCC's in-
terpretation of its intent.
B. The Philadelphia Plan as an Illegal Quota System
The second criticism that has been raised against the Revised
Plan's legality concerns its alleged provision of an illegal quota system. 9
While the quota system has never been specifically denied legitimacy
as a valid means of destroying a discriminatory hiring practice, it has
generally been conceded that a "rigid" and "inflexible" quota would
be either illegal as a denial of equal protection or unacceptable as a
self-defeating mechanism.9" The Solicitor evidently accepts the first
concession as fact since he carefully distinguishes the type of "numerical
standard" employed in the Revised Plan from the "fixed" quota.9'
84. 115 CONG. Rzc. 13,089 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1969).
85. Washington Post, Dec. 21, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
86. 115 CONG. RXC. 17,625 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1969).
87. An interesting discussion took place during the Senate debate which might
illustrate one reason for some senators' vote:
Mr. Doi.: Second, if the motion to table fails, where are we? We are here
tomorrow, in others words?
Mr. SCOTT: And Christmas and New Year's.
The PRESIDING OFFICER: If the motion to table fails, the amendment in dis-
agreement would be before this body.
Mr. JAvrTS: And would be debatable.
The PRESIDING OFFICER: And would be debatable.
Mr. SCOTT: And if the motion to table fails, as far as the Chair is able to
advise us, we may be here for Christmas or New Year's?
The PRESIDING OFFICER: The motion is debatable for quite sometime.
A motion to recede was finally made on which debate was limited to one and one-half
hours. 115 CONG. Rgc. 17,624-25 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1969).
88. 115 CONG. Rsc. 17,626 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1969).
89. A "quota" is a "proportional part or share of a fixed total, amount or
quantity . . . the number of persons of a specified kind permitted to enter, join or
immigrate." RANDOM Housn DICTIONARY Oi THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1182 (unabr.
ed. 1967).
90. See Bittker, The Case of the Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experiment in
Race Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387 (1962); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal
World: Equality for the Negro - The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw.U.L.
REv. 363 (1966) ; Vieira, Racial Imbalance, Black Separatism, and Permissible Classi-fication by Race, 67 MICH. L. Rzv. 1553 (1969) ; Developments, Equal Protection,
82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
91. Solicitor's Memorandum 31.
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Very few courts have been faced with the problem of the "fixed"
quota but, in Hughes v. Superior Court,92 the California Supreme
Court affirmed the awarding of an injunction to prevent blacks from
picketing to compel an employer to hire blacks as clerks in a ratio
corresponding to the number of black to white customers. The court
said:
The fact that those seeking such discrimination do not demand
that it be practiced as to all employees of a particular employer
diminishes in no respect the unlawfulness of their purpose; they
would, to the extent of a fixed proportion, make the right to work
for Lucky dependent not on fitness for the work nor on an equal
right of all, regardless of race, to compete in an open market,
but rather, on membership in a particular race. 93
The Supreme Court,94 in affirming the decision, stated that California
has the right to enjoin peaceful picketing when the purpose of that
picketing is contrary to state policy - which did condemn the quota
system. While the Court made no conclusive statement on the "quota"
issue, because the petitioners' claim was based on a denial of due process,
evidently the Court felt that picketing for such a purpose was not
within the protection of the due process clause.95 However, Hughes
has been generally cited as outlawing "fixed" racial quotas." Two
more recent cases97 also support the conclusion that a "fixed" quota
would be in violation of the policy expressed in section 703(j) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Solicitor has taken rather explicit steps to differentiate the
"numerical standards" provided for by the Revised Plan from the
"illegal quotas." His first contention is that a quota is, by definition,
fixed; the "goals" provided for by the Plan are flexible; therefore,
the standards there are not, by definition, quotas. His second dis-
tinguishing feature is "the consequence of failing to meet the standard
or goal." Under the Revised Plan, a failure to meet the "goals"
does not automatically constitute noncompliance, but rather serves
only "as a starting point in determining good faith compliance."9"
92. 32 Cal. 2d 850, 198 P.2d 885 (1948), aff'd 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
93. 198 P.2d at 889.
94. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
95. Id. at 464. But Justice Frankfurter noted:
To deny to California the right to ban picketing in the circumstances of this
case would mean that there could be no prohibition of the pressure of picketing
to secure proportional employment on ancestral grounds of Hungarians in Cleve-
land, of Poles in Buffalo, of Germans in Milwaukee, of Portuguese in New Bed-ford, of Mexicans in San Antonio, of the numerous minority groups in New York,
and so on through the whole gamut of racial and religious concentrations in
various cities.
96. See, e.g., Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681 (N.D. Il1. 1960),
aff'd 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961). In this case, a developer's planned integrationprogram was denied legitimacy, the court noting that the "fixed" quota would operate
to preclude Blacks from true open housing.
97. Centennial Laundry Co. v. West Side Organization, 34 Ill. App. 2d 257, 215N.E.2d 443 (1966); Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St. 2d
35, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1969).
98. Solicitor's Memorandum 31-32.
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As to his first argument, it would seem fatuous to reject a rigid
ten percent quota but accept one which provides goals of from eight
to twelve percent. The efficacy of this type of standard obviously
rests in its minimum level. Theoretically, under the first example,
failure to meet the exact requirement would result in a determination
of noncompliance. Under the second example, a failure to meet the
minimum requirement would be determinative of noncompliance. In
either case, a minimum goal must be achieved, the only difference
being, that in the second instance, exceeding the minimum by a specified
degree would not be penalized.
As to his second argument, the consequences of failure to achieve
a goal would hardly seem determinative of the nature of the standard.
While it -is true that failure to achieve the lower requirement does
not result automatically in a violation, there nevertheless do exist the
immediate consequences of a conference at which the contractor must
prove a good faith effort on his part to achieve the goals. It would
seem that the difference visited upon the employer under the "fixed"
quota plan and the "flexible" goal standard of the Revised Plan are
a matter of degree only and would not appear to be a valid basis upon
which to distinguish the two standards. Although the administrative
hearing, at which the issue of the contractor's good faith effort to
comply is determined, may not be considered a legally recognizable
injury,99 it would nevertheless seem to be an incentive for invidious
discrimination. And the fact that the burden of proving a good faith
effort to comply is on the contractor, in addition to increasing that
incentive, may be a deprivation of due process.100 However these
arguments were rejected in Contractors Association v. Shultz, 1 the
first case to consider the legality of the Revised Plan. The court
rested its holding that the Revised Plan does not involve an illegal
quota on the fact that under the Plan the contractor who does not
meet his employment goal would not be subject to penalty if he
could show a good faith effort to meet his commitment.
The Comptroller, arguing against the plan's legality, extends his
criticism beyond a consideration of the standards provided for in the
Revised Plan and attacks the very premise upon which the Plan
is grounded:
Whether the provisions of the Plan requiring a bidder to commit
himself to hire - or make every good faith effort to hire - at
least the minimum number of minority group employees specified
in the ranges established for the designated trades is, in fact, a
"quota" system (and therefore admittedly contrary to the Civil
Rights Act) or is a "goal" system, is in our view largely a matter
99. See Myers v. Bethlehem Ship Building Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
100. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965), which held that a hearing
subsequently granted to petitioner who had not been given proper notice of pending
adoption proceedings did not cure the constitutional infirmity because petitioner was
thereby forced to assume certain burdens of proof which normally would have rested
with respondents.
101. No. 70-18 (E.D. Pa., March 13, 1970).
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of semantics, and tends to divert attention from the end result
of the Plan - that contractors commit themselves to making race
or national origin a factor for consideration in obtaining their
employees.10
2
He bases this contention largely on the legislative history of the
Act. In addition to the senatorial impressions noted earlier,'08 he
cites two other interpretations of the Act importing the "race should
not be a factor" concept. 1' 4
The Solicitor, however, controverts the Comptroller's basic premise,
asserting that the Revised Plan justifiably requires a consideration of
race. This conclusion is based on two separate lines of reasoning. First,
he argues that the "affirmative action" obligation demands a considera-
tion of race. 105 "Affirmative action" in Executive Order 10,925 was
sanctioned by Congress in the passage of Title VII ;16 the Secretary
of Labor, pursuant to Executive Order 11,246, defined the scope of
the terms ;o7 as defined, the regulations impose an obligation to prevent
future discrimination and to remedy the effects of past discrimination;
this concept of "affirmative action" has been sanctioned by the courts
in other cases involving Title VII;l08 therefore, a program which
attempts to correct the effects of past discrimination is entirely valid.
However, the Solicitor proceeds to assert that a limited conception of
"affirmative action," i.e., where no specific numerical standards are
provided, would be valid in non-construction trades, but that it would
be totally inadequate because of the "strange nature" of the construc-
102. Comptroller's Opinion 7 (emphasis added).
103. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
104. Senator Humphrey (D., Minn.) :
Title VII prohibits discrimination. In effect, it says that race, religion, and
national origin are not to be used for the basis for hiring or firing. Title VII is
designed to encourage hiring on the basis of ability and qualifications, not race
or religion.
110 CONG. Rgc. 6549 (1964).
Senator Clark (D., Pa.)
Nothing in the bill will interfere with merit, hiring, or merit promotion. The
bill simply eliminates consideration of color from the decision to hire or promote.
Id. at 7218.
One further reference to the legislative history is necessary to a complete under-
standing of the reasoning behind the Comptroller's objections. The Clark-Case memo-
randum reads:Question. If an employer obtains his employees from a union hiring hall
through operation of his labor contract is he in fact the true employer from the
standpoint of discrimination because of race, color, religion, or national origin
when he exercises no choice in their selection?
Answer: An employer who obtains his employees from a union hiring hall
through operation of a labor contract is still an employer. If the hiring hall dis-
criminates against Negroes, and sends him only white, he is not guilty of dis-
crimination - but the union hiring hall would be.
Id. at 7217.
105. Solicitor's Memorandum 27-28.
106. See notes 74-75 supra and accompanying text.
107. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40 (1969).
108. Heat and Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Quarles
v. Phillip Morris, 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968); United States v. Local 189,
United Papermakers, 282 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. La. 1968). But see United States v. H.K.
Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968); Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F.
Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968) ; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D.N.C.
1968).
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tion industry.109 The "strange nature" of the industry is due to two
considerations: contractors must hire a new complement of employees
for each project; and contractors rely almost exclusively upon unions
for their sources of manpower. Since there is a constantly changing
workforce, it is necessary to achieve equal employment opportunity
on each project, and the sources of referrals are supplied from unions
which have a minority membership that is negligible. Therefore
something more than the limited affirmative action programs would
be necessary to effectively produce equal employment opportunity.
This argument, of course, relies very heavily upon the "strange
nature" of the construction industry which warrants this special
treatment. Although the high turnover in workforce might facilitate
prompt implementation of a goal system, this alone does not seem to
be a valid justification. Nor is there an adequate explanation of why
a continued, limited affirmative action program, properly enforced,
would not adequately achieve positive results. Reliance is also placed
on the fact that contractors rely almost exclusively upon unions which
are guilty of discriminatory admission procedures for their sources
of manpower.
Indeed, the essence of the Philadelphia Plan seems to be that it
provides a method, albeit indirect, by which the effect of the firmly
established discriminatory practices of the local craft unions may
be minimized. Of course, if this analysis is correct, the question
arises: out of fairness to the contractors, and in order to most effectively
remedy the effects of discrimination, shouldn't governmental action of
this sort be directed to the violators themselves?
Second, the Solicitor notes that. the affirmative action concept
has been judicially determined to require steps to overcome the effects
of past discrimination. However, it is at least questionable whether
the affirmative action concept the Solicitor speaks of may be equated
with its namesake in other areas of civil rights. As the Comptroller
notes:
Even if the present composition of an employer's work force or
the membership of a union is the result of past discrimination,
there is no requirement imposed by the Constitution, by a mandate
of the Supreme Court, or by the Civil Rights Act for an employer
or a union to affirmatively desegregate its personnel or member-
ship." 0
The Solicitor relies on two recent cases to support the proposition
that courts have sanctioned the use of numerical standards to correct
the effects of past discrimination."' In United States v. Jefferson
County Board of Education,12 the court approved the use of per-
centages, in the form of HEW guidelines, as a "rule of thumb" for
109. Solicitor's Memorandum 28-29.
110. Comptroller's Opinion 13 (emphasis added).
111. Solicitor's Memorandum 33-35.
112. 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966).
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measuring progress in desegregating the local system." 3 However,
it must be noted that the decision was an implementation of the
Brown v. Board of Education"' "affirmative action" order, and, in
addition, the court noted: "There is no provision requiring school
authorities to place white children in Negro schools or Negro children
in white schools for the purpose of striking a racial balance in a school
district proportionate to the racial population of the community or
school district."" 5  Analogy to the Revised Plan's comparison of
minority group employment to the available minority group labor
force is apparent.
In United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education,"6
the Court affirmed a plan which was to provide for the allocation of
teachers on a three to two ratio (white to black) in each school
throughout the system. But the conclusion that this case represented
judicial sanction of numerical standards is fallacious, for the Court,
noting that the school board had remained completely intransigent in
the face of the Brown edict, insisted that these requirements must not
be "rigid" and "inflexible." Also, the district court's plan which was
approved also provided that any further hiring, assignment or dis-
missals of teachers would be effected without consideration of race
or color." 7 Finally, it is interesting to note the ratio of white to
black teachers in the entire system at the time the plan was intro-
duced was three to two. Thus, if the teachers were assigned simply
by chance - or without regard to race - there is the very strong
probability that the ratio in each school would mirror the ratio in
the entire system." 8
The Solicitor has also cited several cases under Title VII" 9
involving remedial relief which could be characterized as "quotas."
These cases were decided under section 70 6 (g)"20 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 which provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged
in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice
charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent
from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include
reinstatement or hiring of employees. . . .No order of the court
shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as
a member of a union or the hiring, reinstatement or promotion of
an individual as an employee . .. if such individual was refused
admission, suspended or expelled or was refused employment or
advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other
113. Id. at 886-87.
114. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
115. 372 F.2d at 886.
116. 395 U.S. 225 (1969).
117. 12 RAcZ REL. L. RiP. 1200, 1205-06 (1967).
118. Vieira, Racial Imbalance, Black Separatism, and Permissible Classification
by Race, 67 MicH. L. Riv. 1553, 1603 (1969).
119. Solicitor's Memorandum 37-39. See note 108 infra.
120. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g).
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than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin or in violation of section 704(a).
While this section does use "affirmative action," the tenor of the
entire section would seem to suggest that it is directed at the individual
whose complaint had been found justified. In that case the court
would have the power to enjoin the employer from continuing in the
same fashion and to compel the employer to hire the particular
individual harmed.
Illustrative is Heat and Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 21 where the
union was found guilty of denying petitioners membership solely on the
basis of race. The court ordered the union to admit these individuals,
to redefine its membership criteria and, in the interim, to refer blacks
and whites alternately for jobs. The union urged that such a plan
was violative of section 703(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 -
a contention which the court rejected without comment. A close read-
ing of section 703(j) reveals that no labor organization may be com-
pelled to grant preferential treatment to minority groups because of
an imbalance which exists in regard to the number it refers for em-
ployment and the number in the workforce or in the geographic area.
The court made no reference to a racial imbalance; it was simply
trying to correct the effects of past discrimination. While this con-
tention may seem inapposite to earlier arguments, it must be pointed
out that the Revised Plan does make racial imbalance a criterion for
determining acceptable levels of achievement.
Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College District, 100122 is sini-
larly distinguishable. There, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that
the lowest bidder's bid on a federally aided construction project was
properly rejected because the affirmative action program was condi-
tioned on the availability of blacks for employment. The second lowest
bidder's bid was properly accepted since he had assured black repre-
sentation on the project through a "manning table" which predicted
the number of blacks to be employed. The specifications for the "man-
ning table" unlike the Revised Plan were not directed by the OFCC nor
were they based on a computation of racial imbalance, nor was there
any indication that punitive action would be taken against the contractor
for failure to achieve the projected figures. The Court was careful to
emphasize the fact that the table was directed not to guaranteeing
equal employment but to assuring equal employment opportunity. 23
IV. PROBLEMS
There are several problems which will arise in the operation of
the Revised Plan. A hypothetical will best illustrate some of the
contradictions and inequities that must develop under the terms of
121. 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
122. 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907, aff'g 238 N.E.2d 839 (1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1004 (1970).
123. 249 N.E.2d at 911.
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the program as it is now proposed and the "preferential treatment"
that seems implicit in the effective operation of the Plan.
Under the terms of the Revised Plan, a contractor would submit
his bid and affirmative action program to the contracting agency, and,
after approval of his plan by the OFCC, he would be awarded the
contract. In his affirmative action plan, he must assure the agency
that he will attempt to have a minority group representation of from
five to nine percent during the first year of the project. This figure
accords with the Revised Plan's minimum specifications. The existence
of a collective bargaining agreement with a local union does not
affect this contractual obligation. If such an agreement requiring the
contractor to accept only union referrals exists with a union which
is guilty of discriminatory practices, the contractor is obligated to use
other methods and sources under his good-faith effort duty."2 4
In order to perform his contract, the contractor needs twenty-five
electrical workers. Thirty have either been referred by the union or
have applied independently. He has hired twenty-four men - one of
whom is black; he has rejected three blacks as unqualified; for the
remaining one position, he has two applicants of equal qualifications -
one of whom is white, the other black. In order to be deemed in
compliance with his affirmative action program, he must select the
black. But, if he hires the black solely in order to meet his requirement,
it would seem that the white has been denied employment because
he is white - clearly a form of "reverse discrimination." However,
if the contractor selects the white, he will not be deemed in compliance
with his program, and he must now prove a good faith effort on his
part to achieve these goals. If he chose the white because of his own
prejudices, he has discriminated on the basis of race. If he chose the
white by chance selection, he still must prove a good faith effort. As a
practical matter, it would seem that the contractor would hire the black
in this situation in order to avoid conflict with the OFCC. If this were
the case, it would seem that the white would be able to file a complaint
with the OFCC - the avowed purpose of which is to provide equal
employment opportunity for all without regard to race, creed, color or
national origin.12 5
Even when the applicants' qualifications are unequal, the contractor
may be placed in a precarious position. Suppose the same fact situa-
tion as in the above hypothetical, except that, of the remaining two
applicants, the black is extremely well experienced and qualified and
the white is a recent graduate of an apprentice program without
experience. However, the contractor sees a great supervisory potential
in the white. If he selects the white, the contractor's compliance
posture is subject to review by the OFCC. If the test applied is to
be one of objectivity, the contractor will be deemed to have not exer-
cised a good faith effort. Obviously, the only equitable standard is
124. Discrimination in referral for employment, even if pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement is prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(1)-(3). 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (1)-(3) (1964). See Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB,
365 U.S. 667 (1961).
125. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.1 (1969).
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a subjective one, but the difficulties implicit in administering such a
standard would provide very complex problems for determination.
The acceptable standards are in the form of a range of goals. The
above discussion has centered on a failure to meet the minimum re-
quirements. However, if -the contractor exceeds the upper level of
the standard, presumably, he has not complied with his program and
should, according to the terms of the Revised Plan, be compelled to
prove a good faith effort on his part. But, it is difficult to imagine the
OFCC carrying the program to its logical extension. If the OFCC
did not take the necessary steps to investigate a violation this sort,
then, for all practical purposes, the Revised Plan has an effective
standard represented by the minimum level of the acceptable range,
and it becomes the rigid and inflexible quota condemned even by the
Solicitor.
Aside from these considerations, if the Revised Plan is followed
literally, it would seem to be self defeating. It is clearly stated that
no contractor will be required to practice "reverse discrimination" by
selecting less qualified applicants because of their race. But the Revised
Plan recognizes that very few minority group members have been
granted union membership. Since most of the hiring is the result of
union referrals, it must necessarily follow that few minority group
members have had any actual work experience. Experience must be
the primary consideration in determining an applicant's qualifications
in these highly skilled trades. Therefore, if the contractor is to hire
only on the basis of the most qualified applicants, except in isolated
instances, the minority group member will be relegated to a secondary
position as long as whites with any experience have applied for the
same position. If the Revised Plan truly does not require "preferential
treatment," then the black has not been aided.
CONCLUSION
There is clear evidence that the unions in the specified trades have
been guilty of employing discriminatory membership practices, and,
since this nation is devoted to the principle of the equality of man, it
is clear that remedial steps must be taken to eradicate these instances
of prejudice. The Comptroller adopts the position that there is
absolutely no mandate for any type of preferential treatment to more
quickly bring the black race to the status of true equality. But, it
would seem that the case law cited by the Solicitor would clearly
mitigate against this interpretation. Whether or not preferential treat-
ment is psychologically sound for this nation - for both black and
white - is a question that has no easy answer. 2 ' On the other
hand, the OFCC, with meritorious objectives, has sought to strain
126. See R. CARTER, D. KENYON, P. MARCUSt & L. MILLER, EQUALITY (1965);
Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro - The Problem
of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 363 (1966) ; Vieira, Racial Imbalance, Black
Separatism and Permissible Classification by Race, 67 MICH. L. Rzv. 1553, 1604-26
(1969).
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the existing case law - in the face of a clearly evidenced contrary
senatorial interpretation - and apply numerical standards.
It would seem that a position somewhere between these two
extremes would be the most provident. It must be remembered that
the discriminatory practices involved are those of the unions while
the Revised Plan aims directly at the contractors and only indirectly
at the unions. But, there are very ample provisions in both the Civil
Rights Act of 1964127 and Executive Order 11,246128 through which
the unions could be attacked directly. At the same time, the OFCC -
whose operations have been sanctioned by a congressional appropria-
tion of funds - must still conduct its programs of "affirmative action"
for government contractors. It would seem that an ambitious use,
against the unions, of these weapons coupled with the OFCC implemen-
tation of its approved regulations would withstand objections from
both extremes and, at the same time, alleviate some of the problems
that continue to plague the black labor force.
One further possibility exists - the OFCC plan in effect in the
Cleveland area - the type approved in Weiner. Under this plan there
are no requirements as to specific levels of minority group utilization
which the contractor is obligated to attempt to achieve. At the same
time, solicitations for bids carefully set forth requirements for an
affirmative action plan which would assure black representation. Cer-
tainly there naturally must result a degree of preferential treatment,
but only the very naive will not admit this has been judicially recog-
nized and applauded. A the same time, without demanding percentages
of compliance, the conflict with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would be
avoided, along with the unnecessary debate and delay that must result.
Dennis I. DuBois
127. See note 36 supra.
128. See note 39 supra.
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